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Management Equity Incentive and Performance: Evidence from Listed
Companies of Manufacturing Industry
Jun Huang, Yushan Zou,Guowei Zhu
Management School, Hunan University, Changsha, 410082, China
Abstract: As an important long-term incentive mode, the equity incentive promotes the managers to contribute to the
interest uniformity of managers and shareholders. By using Paired-Samples T test methods and regression analysis method
and choosing companies that issued the equity incentive plan in 2007 as the sample, this paper comparatively analyzes the
differences in the performance of companies before and after the implementation of equity incentive, companies
implementing equity incentive and ones not. Furthermore, factors which influence equity incentive effect are examined. The
results show that equity incentives can promote the company's performance and the incentive effect should be better in the
companies of state-control holding or low ownership concentration companies.
Keywords: equity incentive, financial performance, ownership concentration, managerial ownership proportion
1. INTRODUCTION
Due to the separation of the right of management from ownership, the moral hazard may appear in modern
enterprises, which leads to the incentive and constrain problem at the senior management level. As an important
long-term incentive mode, the equity incentive promotes the managers to contribute to the interest uniformity of
the managers and the shareholders, thus to serve the interest of the shareholders better.
The equity incentive developed vigorously in America from 1950s to 1980s, and spread to other western
countries gradually after 1990s. More than 90% companies have carried out the equity incentive plan among the
top 500 industry companies in the world chosen by Fortune magazine. In China, there is a compatible view on
the importance of the management equity incentive. As an industry with higher market competition degree, the
manufacturing industry accounts for about 50% of the listed companies implementing the equity incentive. In
general, the higher competitive degree of the industry is, the more management pressure assumed by the senior
managers would be and dependence on managers’ skills will be higher, thus the effect of the equity incentive
will be more obvious.
Many studies have applied the managerial share-holding proportion as the variable of the equity incentive,
while it may be achieved through the employee stock ownership plan or other non-equity incentive method. In
this paper, we took the companies that issued the equity incentive plan in 2007 as the sample to reflect the effect
of the equity incentive more directly. And we further analyzed the influence on the equity incentive effect by
many factors such as the equity structure and the ownership concentration.
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. The next section presents our research hypothesis and
a literature review. This is followed by the research design and descriptive analysis section. We describe the
effect analysis in section 4 and the influence factors in section 5, finally, the conclusions.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS
2.1 Literature review
There are two views for the effect of the equity incentive in the academic research which are the relativity
theory and the non-relativity theory.
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The main opinions of the relativity theory include the convergence of interest, managerial entrenchment
and the interval effect theory. The convergence of interest was firstly put forward by Jensen and Meckling (1976)
[1]
, who thought the cost of deviating from the value would decrease with the increase of the ownership of the
managers. While Francis and Smith (1995)[2], Palia and Lichtenberg (1999)[3] thought long-term share-holding
with high percentage of the managers can promote the value of the company. The managerial entrenchment
believes that when the manager owns excessive stocks, his control capacity for the company will intensify,
while the restrictive degree will decrease relatively, then he will pursue his own interests as much as possible to
deviate from the maximized goals for the value. Shivdasani (1993)[4] found that the shareholding of the
managers can generate the “managerial entrenchment” effect, which would reduce the value of the corporation.
Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988)[5] summarized that the obvious non-monotonic relation existed between the
stock right of the management level and the business performance. Bin Li and Yuejing Sun (2009) [6] thought
that the private listed companies in China could incent the equity incentive of the proprietor, but the incentive
strength was waiting to be intensified.
Correspondingly, some other scholars thought that the equity incentive had no relations with the
performance. Foreign scholars Demsetz and Lehn (1985)[7] found that the stock right of managers had no
obvious relations with the corporate performance. Himmelberg (1999)[8] introduced the observable corporate
characteristics and the influenced variables of the fixed behaviors to explain the managerial ownership
proportion on the basis of the former studies. Gang Wei (2000)[9] indicated that the “interval effect” did not exist
between the amount of the shareholding for the senior managers in the listed companies and the corporate
performance.
2.2 Research hypothesis
The equity incentive promotes the proprietor to hold the stocks of the company to be one of the owners,
then the proprietor and the owners can share the “residual claim” together in order to reach the purpose of
interests uniformity[10], to realize the “incentive compatibility” of both sides. The equity incentive is a long-term
incentive system, and the effect will finally reflect on the performance. So put forward
Hypothesis 1: The equity incentive has significant positive relations with the performance.
The governance situation of the state holding company is different from the non-state holding company. On
the one hand, the state is the major shareholder for the state listed company, the degree of supervision and
restriction for the senior managers is low; on the other hand, due to the tenure restriction for the managers in the
state-owned enterprises, the managers will neglect the long-term development of the enterprises, which will
affect the function of the equity incentive. So put forward
Hypothesis 2: The influence on the business performance for the equity incentive of the state holding and
non-state holding listed corporation exits differences.
The convergence of interest thinks that when the shareholding percentage of the management level is in a
certain range, the managers will have the owner consciousness through holding the stocks, which will improve
the performance. While the managerial entrenchment thinks that when the ownership owned by the managers
increases continuously, they will pursue their own interests rather than maximizing the corporation value, which
will have negative influence on the performance of the corporation[11]. So put forward
Hypothesis 3: The equity incentive can improve the corporation performance when the management
ownership proportion is comparatively low. While the continuous increase, the function will be weakened.
From the point of the equity ownership structure, the connections between the interests of the strong
shareholder and the corporation performance will be tight if the concentration of ownership structure is high.
While for the corporations with dispersive stock right, the restriction for the senior management level is not
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enough, the equity incentive will be more effective. So put forward
Hypothesis 4: The ownership concentration has negative relations with the utility of the equity incentive.
3. RESEARCH DESIGN AND DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS
3.1 Sample selection and data sources
This paper takes 124 listed companies in manufacturing industry implementing the equity incentive in 2007
as sample. And we take the following measures for the 124 corporations according to the purpose of analysis:
reject the ST corporations with bad performance after implementing the equity incentive and those listed
companies with the qualified opinion, refusing to speak and negative opinion by the CPA; reject the
corporations listing after the end of 2007; reject those corporations which stop implementing the equity
incentive halfway and held incomplete data; reject the corporations which are taken over or appear significant
changes for the senior management level after implementing the equity incentive.The remaining 73 listed
corporations in accordance with the requirements are regarded as the research samples. See Table 1 for the
annual number of samples.
Table 1.  Number of samples before and after implementing the equity incentive
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Number 63 73 73 73 72
3.2 Definition of variables
Table 2.  Definition of variables
Variables Code Definition
Rate of Net Profit growth GR (Current net profit/ Base net Profit)*100%-100%
Rate of Return on Common Stockholders’ Equity ROE Net Profit / Shareholders' Equity Balance
Total Assets Turnover TAT Net Sales/Total Assets
Earnings Per Share EPS Income from Continuing Operations / Weighted Average Common Shares
Tobin’s Q Ratio Q （Stock Market Value + Net Debt Market）/ Closing Total Assets
Equity Incentive D if implementing the Equity Incentive，D=1；otherwise，D=0
Percentage of The State-owned Shares SO State Owned Shares/Total Shares
Managerial Ownership Proportion SR Managerial Holding Shares/Total Shares
Ownership Concentration OC the shareholding percentage of  the top ten shareholders
Asset-liability Ratio BS Total Liabilities / Total Assets
Scale of Enterprise SIZE natural logarithm of total assets
percentage of the independent director ID number of independent director/total number of directors
Select the five financial performance indexes, that is, rate of net profit growth, rate of return on common
stockholders’ equity, total assets turnover, earnings per share and Tobin’s Q Ratio, to measure the achievements
of the proprietor. Assume the equity incentive as the dummy variable, if the listed corporation implementing the
equity incentive, the number is 1, otherwise, the number is 0. As for the structure of the stock right, select the
percentage of the state-owned shares, ownership concentration and managerial ownership proportion as the
agency variables. The scale of enterprise decides the influence capacity on the market and the risk resistance
capacity of the corporation, and then affects the performance level of the corporation; proper allocation for the
asset structure of the corporation also has effect on the performance of the corporation; the board of directors
can supervise the management level and make great decisions, while the independent directors have the
independence because they never achieve the payment from the corporation, the higher percentage will
contribute to the better supervision for the corporation, and can affect the performance. In conclusion, select the
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scale of enterprise, asset-liability ratio and the percentage of the independent director as the control variables.
3.3 Descriptive statistics
3.3.1 Characteristics of stock right for sampling corporations
See Table 3 for the whole characteristics of sampling corporations. Therein, the non-state holding
corporations account for 75.34% which is a large percentage, the state holding corporations account for 24.66%;
the sampling corporations account for 36.36% with the shareholding percentage of the senior management level
below 0.1%, and the percentage of sampling corporations below 1% exceeds 50%; the top ten shareholders with
more than 50% percentage account for 63.01%.
Table 3.  Description of whole characteristics of sampling corporations
Nature of control shareholder Managerial ownership proportion Top ten proportion of
share-holding
state holding non-state holding <0.1% 0.1%-1% 1%-10% >10% <50% >50%
N 18 55 16 8 9 9 27 46
Percent 24.66% 75.34% 38.10% 19.05% 21.43% 21.43% 36.99% 63.01%
3.3.2 Financial performance of sampling corporations
Table 4 indicates that various performance indexes in 2007 had been improved obviously, and then the
differentiation appeared after 2007. The rate of net profit growth decreased gradually, while the deficit appeared
in 2009; the rate of return on common stockholders’ equity and the earnings per share kept stable except that
Tobin’s Q decreased dramatically in 2008, so all had been improved compared with that before implementing
the equity incentive.
Table 4.  Descriptive statistics of enterprise performance of sampling corporations
Mean Std. Deviation
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
GR 0.1773 0.9870 0.5340 -0.7767 -0.3101 3.4670 4.9598 4.3743 12.5737 4.8640
ROE 0.0937 0.1200 0.1071 0.1130 0.1130 0.1143 0.0832 0.1380 0.0863 0.1022
TAT 0.8398 0.8938 0.9436 0.8163 0.8973 0.4761 0.4982 0.5217 0.4901 0.5019
EPS 0.3755 0.5211 0.4678 0.4739 0.5072 0.3062 0.3810 0.8142 0.4496 0.5042
Q 1.4049 2.3572 1.4439 2.4885 2.7256 0.4918 1.2256 0.7669 1.4686 1.6419
4. EFFECT ANALYSIS OF EQUITY INCENTIVE
4.1 Paired-samples T test
4.1.1 Comparison of performance before and after implementing the equity incentive for the sampling
corporations
We compared the data in those years before and after implementing the equity incentive for sampling
corporations by using the paired-samples T test. Because the sampling corporations we selected were those
listed corporations which issued the equity incentive in 2007. Therefore, we took the year of 2006 as the sample
before implementing the equity incentive, and respectively took the year of 2008, 2009 and 2010 as the samples
after implementing the equity incentive to carry out the examination for the matched samples for three times,
that is, compare the data in 2008 with 2006, 2009 with 2006 and 2010 with 2006.
See Table 5 for the results of T test for matched samples. Therein, the difference of the total assets turnover
in 2008 and 2006 is 0.079, and it is obvious at the level of 5%; the difference of the earnings per share in 2009
and 2006 is 0.127, and it is obvious at the level of 5%; the difference of Tobin’s Q is 1.12 and it is obvious at the
level of 1%; the difference of the earnings per share in 2010 and 2006 is 0.154 and it is obvious at the level of
5%, the difference of Tobin’s Q is 1.218 and it is obvious at the level of 1%; all these indicate the business
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performance of the sampling corporations between 2008 and 2010 is superior to the year of 2006, which also
accord with the medium and long-term goals for the equity incentive, support the hypothesis 1.
Table 5.  Comparison of the performance indexes before and after
implementing equity incentive and the significance tests
Paired Differences
Mean Std. Deviation
t df Sig.(2-tailed)
GR 0.0118 0.1712 0.5461 62 0.5869
ROE 0.0785 0.2444 2.5508 62 0.0131**
TAT 0.3009 5.1010 0.4294 52 0.6687
EPS 0.1094 0.8280 1.0483 62 0.2989
2008-2006
Q 0.0279 0.5783 0.3834 62 0.7031
GR 0.01969 0.1281 1.2199 62 0.2274
ROE -0.0485 0.3459 -1.1139 62 0.2700
TAT 0.6753 5.9658 0.8395 54 0.4052
EPS 0.1272 0.4471 2.2581 62 0.0269**
2009-2006
Q 1.1230 1.3316 6.6938 62 0.0000***
GR 0.0210 0.1384 1.2098 62 0.2314
ROE 0.0283 0.2587 0.8680 62 0.3887
TAT -0.7575 6.3519 -0.8844 54 0.3796
EPS 0.1536 0.5393 2.2612 62 0.0265**
2010-2006
Q 1.2179 1.4000 6.9045 62 0.0000***
Note: ***, ** and * are obvious respectively in the level of 1%, 5% and 10%.
4.1.2 Comparison of performance of sampling companies with ones not implementing equity incentive
Carry out the paired-samples T test to compare the sampling companies in 2008, 2009 and 2010 after
implementing the equity incentive with the financial performance of ones not implementing the equity incentive.
Compare the performance of the sampling corporations with the matched corporations through the T test to
check the effect of the equity incentive. The character of the first majority shareholder, asset-liability ratio and
the scale of enterprise are the main elements to affect the performance of the listed corporations, so the selection
principles for the matched samples are as follows: first, the corporation does not inform to implement the equity
incentive; second, the character of the first majority shareholder is similar to the sampling corporations; third,
similar to the scale of the sampling corporation, that is, the total assets in the annual report of the equity
incentive is similar to the sampling corporations; fourth, similar to the asset-liability ratio of the sampling
corporation. According to the selected matched sampling corporations, check the effect of the equity incentive
through comparing the performance indexes in three years after implementing the equity incentive for the
sampling corporations with the matched corporations, see Table 6. The rate of return on common stockholders’
equity, rate of net profit growth, earnings per share of the sampling corporations in 2008 have differences with
the matched samples. From the point of the difference and the mean value, in the first year after implementing
the equity incentive, the three indexes are obviously higher than the matched corporations without implementing
the equity incentive, and have passed the significance test at the level of 1%. At the same time, in the second and
the third year that is in 2009 and 2010 after implementing the equity incentive, the difference of the earnings per
share also has passed the significance test at the level of 1%.
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Table 6.  Comparison of performance of sampling companies with the matched ones
Paired Differences
Mean Std. deviation
t df Sig.(2-tailed)
GR 0.0916 0.2515 3.1120 72 0.0030***
ROE 0.0845 0.7078 1.0200 72 0.3112
TAT 3.7464 8.5953 3.2030 53 0.0021***
EPS 0.3348 0.8934 3.2010 72 0.0019***
2008
Q 0.1432 0.9288 1.3170 72 0.1919
GR 0.4490 3.3555 1.1350 71 0.2600
ROE 0.0881 0.6332 1.1880 72 0.2390
TAT -0.2934 14.6498 -0.1500 57 0.8790
EPS 0.2657 0.5703 3.9540 71 0.0000***
2009
Q 0.1244 1.9259 0.5480 71 0.5848
GR 0.0211 0.1388 1.2839 70 0.2031
ROE -0.0282 0.7316 -0.3275 71 0.7437
TAT 1.4965 19.2150 0.5828 55 0.5621
EPS 0.2394 0.7151 2.7805 68 0.0071***
2010
Q 0.1694 2.0315 0.7077 71 0.4814
Note: ***, ** and * are obvious respectively in the level of 1%, 5% and 10%.
4.2 Multiple regression analysis
The earnings per share refer to the net profit produced by per share among all the stock assets of the
corporation, it reflects the profit level per capital, and can reflect the goals of the equity incentive better.
Therefore, we select the earnings per share as the explained variable to measure the performance of the
corporation. In addition, select the equity incentive as the independent variable, and the percentage of the
state-owned shares, ownership concentration, managerial ownership proportion, scale of enterprise,
asset-liability ratio and the percentage of the independent director as the control variable. Therefore, model 1
measuring the relations between the equity incentive and the performance of the corporation is as follows:
EPS=a0+a1D+a2SO+a3 OC +a4 SR +a5BS+a6SIZE+a7ID+ε    (1)
Table 7 regression results indicate that the equity incentive has the positive relations with the performance.
The ownership concentration, asset-liability ratio, scale of enterprise and the percentage of the independent
directors have passed the significance test at the level of 1%. The percentage of the state-owned shares has
passed the significance test at the level of 10%.
Table 7.  Regression results of model 1
（Constant） D SO OC SR BS SIZE ID
B
-2.4899 0.1869 -0.1559 0.6858 0.3104 -0.7771 0.1390 -0.7326
Std. error 0.3770 0.0592 0.0916 0.1259 0.3940 0.1107 0.0181 0.2428
t
-6.6040 3.1562 -1.7017 5.4472 0.7878 -7.0181 7.6815 -3.0180
Sig 0.0000*** 0.0021*** 0.0886* 0.0000*** 0.4312 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0031***
Note: ***, ** and * are obvious respectively in the level of 1%, 5% and 10%.
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5. FACTORS AFFECTING THE EQUITY INCENTIVE
5.1 Model design
We increased the interactive variable of the virtual variable for the equity incentive and the character of the
controlling shareholders, managerial ownership proportion and the ownership concentration to check the
influence on the equity incentive and the performance of the corporation by the character of the stock right.
Therein, the virtual variables of the character of the controlling shareholders: the state-owned controlling
corporation is 1 and the non-state controlling corporation is 0. The virtual variables of the ownership
concentration: the percentage of the top ten shareholders with more than 50% percentage is 1 and less than 50%
percentage is 0. The virtual variables of managerial ownership proportion: ① the shareholding percentage of the
senior management level more than 10% is 1 and less than 10% is 0, ② the shareholding percentage of the
senior management level below 1% exceeds 10% is 1 and less than 1% is 0. We rejected the indistinctive SR
variables in the regression analysis of model 1, and other controlling variables remain unchanged. Therefore, in
the following model 2 – measuring the influence on the equity incentive and the performance by the character of
the stock right, SQ represents the virtual variable of the character of the controlling shareholders, ownership
concentration and managerial ownership proportion in different regression analysis.
   EPS=a0+a1D+a2D*SQ + a3SO+ a4OC+a5BS+a6SIZE+a7ID+ε   (2)
5.2 Results analysis
See Table 8 for the regression model results. The interactive coefficients of model 2(a) and 2(c) are obvious
at the level of 5%, and it is obvious at the level of 1% for model 2(d). The interactive coefficient of model 2(a)
is -0.3, indicating that the influence will decrease 0.3 for the equity incentive of the state-owned corporation on
the performance. It’s likely that the lack of supervision of the state-owned holding corporations led the managers
to implement the earnings management easily, so it supports hypothesis 2. The interactive coefficient of model
2(b) is not obvious, and the interactive coefficient of model 2(c) is 0.1506, indicating when the managerial
ownership proportion is between 1% and 10%, the incentive effect is better, so it supports hypothesis 3. The
interactive coefficient of model 2(d) is -0.2533 and it is obvious at the level of 5%, this indicating that the
incentive effect will decrease when the ownership concentration exceeds 50%, this may because the high
concentration can effectively control the agency risk and the hazard risk, therefore, the incentive for the
corporations with lower ownership concentration is much more effective, so it supports the hypothesis 4.
Table 8.  Regression results of model 2
(Constant) D D*SQ SO OC BS SIZE ID
-2.5075*** 0.2673*** -0.2999** -0.1292 0.6711*** -0.7816*** 0.1402*** -0.7352***Model 2(a)
(0.3746) (0.0681) (0.1293) (0.0917) (0.1245) (0.1103) (0.0180) (0.2419)
-2.4605*** 0.1896*** -0.0097 0.1674* 0.7018*** -0.7746*** 0.1374*** -0.7277***Mode 2(b)
（0.3763） (0.0634) (0.1533) (0.0906) (0.1243) (0.1108) (0.0180) (0.2428)
-2.5099*** 0.1257* 0.1506** -0.1561* 0.6985*** -0.7712*** 0.1393*** -0.7138***Model 2(c)
(0.3752) (0.0665) (0.0741) (0.0904) (0.1239) (0.1104) (0.0180) (0.2422)
-2.4542*** 0.3466*** -0.2533*** -0.1684* 0.7819*** -0.7719*** 0.1350*** -0.7317***Model 2(d)
(0.3743) (0.0945) (0.1180) (0.0903) (0.1294) (0.1294) (0.0180) (0.2420)
Note: (1) SQ is the virtual variable of the controlling shareholder in model 2 (a), and is the virtual variable of the shareholding percentage of
the senior management in model 2 (b), and is the virtual variable of the managerial ownership proportion as ②  in the model 2 (c), and is the
ownership concentration in model 2 (d). (2) ***, ** and * are obvious respectively in the level of 1%, 5% and 10%, the value in the bracket
is the standard deviation of the coefficient.
6. CONCLUSION
While the market competition of the manufacturing industry is fierce, the development of the enterprises
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has close relations with the behavior of the managers, so it is necessary to motivate the managers to improve the
performance. The research found that the performance level of sampling companies is higher when after
implementing the equity incentive compared with the ones before this action, and the performance of all those
sampling companies which have implemented the equity incentive is superior to those matched ones without
this action. Therefore, the equity incentive can effectively improve the performance of companies. The character
of the stock right and the percentage of the shareholding of the senior management level will affect the effect of
the equity incentive; the effect for non-state owned holding listed companies is superior to the state-owned listed
ones; when the share-holding percentage of the senior management level is lower, the increase of the
shareholding percentage for the senior management level can intensify the effect of equity incentive, while the
shareholding percentage of the senior management level is too large, the effect of equity incentive will be
weakened; the incentive effect for companies with low concentration of stock right is much more obvious.
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